Other Projects were aimed at endowing the interface with`emotions' rather than with a`personality' 1 : this happened, in particular, in educational systems, in which showing`empathy' with the emotional state of the student is considered a property that increases the system's chance of success (just an example: Lester et al., 2000) . In de¢ning how to endow a system with an emotional state, the main reference is Ortony, Clore and Collins' theory (OCC: Ortony et al, 1988) and its further developments by Elliott (Elliott & Siegle, 1993) .
Finally, some authors studied how other attitude-related variables, likè cognitive overload' or`doubt', may be recognised through speech or language style analysis (Berthold & Jameson, 1999; Carberry & Schroeder, 2001) or how simulated dialogs might be enriched with affect-related issues such as humor',`deception' or`politeness' (Elliott, 1999; Castelfranchi et al., submitted; Ardissono et al., 1999) .
However, the ¢rst attempts to model affective factors and to adapt humanĉ omputer interaction to some of them were performed about 20 years ago: to make just one remarkable example, the PhD Thesis of Carbonell was about how some knowledge of personality could improve story understanding. In a review of these systems, Pfeifer distinguishes between systems aimed at augmenting AI models of cognition' and`AI models of emotion'. In the ¢rst category, he places the models in which`cognition is, in a sense, augmented by emotion' and in the second, those in which`emotion is the central focus' (Pfeifer, 1988) . The ¢rst experiences reviewed in this paper date back to the beginning of years sixties, although the majority of them concentrates from the years eighties on; the prevailing application domain is conversation and natural language processing.
Why, then, after so long is this ¢eld still seen as`something far away in the future', a goal dif¢cult to achieve? How far are we from realising an interface that really adapts to the`affective' state of the User, even if only in speci¢c and well delimited domains? This Special Issue is aimed at promoting a re£ection on this subject in our Journal, with a set of papers that refer to signi¢cant experiences in the domain. It comes after two Workshops on`Attitudes, Personality and Emotions in User-Adapted Interaction' which were organised in the scope of the`User Modeling' 1999 and 2001 Conferences (contributions to these Workshops may be found at the websites: http://aos2.uniba,it:8080/ws-um99.html and http://aos2.uniba.it: 8080/ws-um01.html). Let me, ¢rst of all, brie£y present these papers.
The Papers in this Special Issue
Although the Call was open to all problems related to adapting User Interfaces tò affective' factors, the contributions that appear in this Special Issue 2 are focused on emotions and the way they may be recognised, manifested and described: these methods are essential to build systems that are able to speculate about the emotional state of a User and to respond in a way that is appropriate to the situation, irrespective of whether they have a graphical, a natural language or an agent-based interface.
The ¢rst two papers (by Bartneck & Mozziconacci) deal with the problem of how some emotional states that are described in the literature (for instance, in the OCC theory) may be manifested through facial expressions or through the voice. Bartneck's contribution is aimed at responding to the question of whether a re¢ned representation of the human face is needed to manifest these basic emotions: this question is relevant, considering the evolution of technology towards interfaces of small dimension and with a low graphical resolution, in computers with limited memory and software resources. The author compares, in particular, thè convincingness' of a face that is rendered with decreasing levels of graphical complexity with that of a`natural human' face or of a 3D`computer-rendered' face a very simple bidimensional image accompanied by an audio. He describes a set of experimental studies which show that some emotions (fear, for instance) are more dif¢cult to represent and less convincing than others (surprise and happiness, for instance). The convincingness of emotions does not seem to be in£uenced signi¢-cantly by abstraction, while it seems to be favoured by the combination of different media (audio and video). Another result of Bartneck's studies that merits re£ection is that the human ability to distinguish among the different facial expressions that were shown to them does not guarantee that the emotion they attribute to these faces are the same as those that the study designers intended to attribute them. On one side, these results are encouraging, as they seem to prove that a sophisticated technology is not really necessary to represent emotions in embodied animated agents. On another side, they are not reassuring because, as the author says, user-machine communication might fail if the expression is frequently misinterpreted '.
The results of the studies about emotional speech synthesis that are described in the paper by Mozziconacci seem to head in the same direction. In these studies, natural speech was compared with its manipulation via analysis-resynthesis and with synthetic speech. Also in this case, some emotions seem to be more easily recognisable than others (again, fear, for instance); again, the cultural context and the situation can in£uence the human interpretation of signals. But the positive ¢nding is that, by manipulating the values of only three acoustical parameters (pitch level, pitch range and speech rate), different emotions, such as boredom, sadness or indignation may apparently be represented in a rather`believable' way.
A common question that is unanswered by the two studies is how much the emotion intensity affects its perception and the convincingness of its representation; that is, whether exaggerated emotional expressions (in both the face and the voice) may be avoided without reducing correct recognition. Another unsolved question also remains: according to Moon and Nass, to answer positively to the question: Can computer personalities be human personalities?', computer systems should satisfy not only the`identi¢cation requirement' (individuals should correctly identify the particular personality that is manifested in the computer) but also the`behavioral requirement' (individuals should behave, towards the computer, in the same way they would behave towards a person with the same personality) . This test appears to be even more dif¢cult to pass than the famous Turing's imitation game (Turing, 1950) .
Should a machine, though, have a face and a voice to put empathy in its interaction with the Users and to accord its behavior to their affective state? Certainly not: innumerable proofs in favour of this claim have already been provided in the studies by Nass and colleagues, which proved that even common interfaces, in which only the name given to the computer, the phrasing of the text displayed, the interaction order and the graphical aspects were manipulated, could show personality traits and emotions that might be interpreted in terms of the FFM. Similar results were shown in studies concerning natural language communication, in which the discourse structure and the argumentation style were varied according to the emotional state of the participants in the dialog and their relationships (Wegman, 1988; Loyall & Bates, 1997; Walker et al., 1997; de Rosis et al., 1999 .
An example of a graphical interface that adapts to the emotional state of the User is described in Hudlicka's paper. The system described (ABAIS) reacts to the User's anxiety state by varying the interface layout and the type of information displayed. The underlying hypothesis is that affective states have a major impact on performance (a problem that is especially serious in the application domain considered, that of air pilots) and that the consequences of some of these effects can be predicted: in particular, they alter the nature of attentional processing, activate or inhibit perceptual and cognitive schemata and promote or inhibit the selection of particular actions. The User's anxiety state is assessed via a knowledge-based approach which combines a variety of user data (e.g. personality traits, individual history, simulated physiological data) and task factors to derive the most likely user state; the system predicts the impact of this state on the user behavior and selects a strategy that aims at avoiding possible errors through an adaptation of the interface. The approach was implemented and demonstrated in a prototype of a ¢ghter pilot simulation and demonstrated the feasibility of adapting to the affective state of the User, although only for a speci¢c state (anxiety), via a speci¢c method (GUI format), and for a speci¢c category of Users (air pilots). The architecture and principles behind its design provide, however, useful hints on how systems with adaptation abilities might be built, in similar contexts.
Are we sure, though, that we know exactly what we are talking about? Are we certain that the terms which are commonly employed to describe emotional states or visual impressions correspond to clear, time invariant and sharable concepts? This is not a minor question because, if it is not so, the assumptions behind the design of any system that is able to recognise and manifest affective states are not satis¢ed.`Of all human experiences, emotions seem to be among the least susceptible to verbal description' (Clore and Ortony, 1988) . This basic question is the common core of the two systems developed by Lisetti and Bianchi-Bertouze (MOUE and MIKE) that are described in the last paper of this Issue. At the basis of MOUE, there is a theory of emotion concepts as an ontology whose nodes are classical schemata of Arti¢cial Intelligence; every emotion is described through a list of components (valence, intensity, duration, focality, etc). Rather than attempting a systematic description of the main affective states (which are usually denoted with labels like`happy',`sad', surprised', etc), MOUE intends to provide a tool to build these descriptions as`computational schemata', through a system-User interaction. The User's face expression is captured and the emotion manifested is interpreted in an a shared way, by interactively building and linguistically labelling the schema that describes it. The input given to MIKE, on the contrary, is not a facial expression but a image that carries a`visual impression' (à happy', a`romantic', a`cold', a`fresh' image): this impression is de¢ned, as well, in a shared way between system and User, through a set of visual characteristics of the image itself. Although the semantic repertoire of a image is much wider than face expressions, the two systems (MOUE and MIKE) are based on a common hypothesis: that languages employed to manifest affective states (metaphorical language, body language and verbal language) are ambiguous and may be misinterpreted and that this ambiguity may be reduced through an interactive negotiation between User and system. This is an interesting hypothesis indeed, that does not resolve, however, the question of whether the`shared language' which emerges from this interaction will have a general value: i.e., whether this language will be User-independent or at least context-independent for the same User. This will certainly be veri¢ed when the two described systems will be applied to a number of cases larger than those that were examined in the study described in this paper.
This Special Issue ends with the reviews of three books: the ¢rst two, by Annika Waern, concern`the' classic book in the ¢eld of affective interaction (`Affective Computing', by Rosalind Picard) and the more recent`Human Cognition and Social Agent Technology', by Kerstin Dautenhan. The third review, by Kristina Hook, is about the last publication in the domain (`Affective Interactions', edited by Ana Paiva). The two books, together with the papers published in this Issue, offer us a number of re£ections on what might be done to favour adaptation of human^machine interaction to affective factors: I wish to discuss brie£y some of these open issues, in the hope that this may encourage new contributions from people in the User Modeling area. But, before this, a curious remark: what epidemiologists would call the`sex ratio' of this Special Issue (and of contributions, in general, to this particular domain) is strongly and evidently unbalanced in favour of women (with the very welcome exception of Cristoph Bartneck!). As Rosalind Picard says in her interview at the end of the book edited by Ana Paiva,`In my own experience, I've never had such a high percentage of women in my research group as I've had since including affect on the agenda, but this is only one data point.' Apparently, there are many more similar`data points', all over the world.
Towards a Modeling of the Cognitive Components of A¡ective Factors
Although, as I said, we have recently seen a £ourishing of research initiatives aimed at endowing machines with the ability to make`affective' interactions with the User, research efforts in this domain are focused on`communication aspects' and on thè external expression' of affective factors rather than on their cognitive background and their behavioral consequences. Communication is one of the ingredients of personality: for instance, it is the main component of the`extraversion' factor, in the FFM. However, traits and attitudes that may be relevant in HCI are not necessarily manifested through communication or through a clearly distinguishable external expression. For instance, a`delegation' and`help' trait or attitude is implictly embedded into any User Interface, although often in a not consciousöand even not consistentöway (Castelfranchi et al., 1998) . In addition, even if only communication aspects are considered, reacting appropriately to the Interlocutor's (human or arti¢cial agent) manifestation of an affective state may require reasoning on the causes of this state rather than just recognising it. I have to understand the reasons of your fear to be effective in reassuring you; I have to understand exactly why you are angry and with which person if I want to appease you, and so on. Understanding this reason (and, often, even interpreting an expression) is, in general, not easy; in multimodal conversation or story understanding, interpretation of the subtle meaning of utterances is not immediate or unique. Ekman, for instance, showed that the same facial signal may occur in very different situations (Ekman & Friesen, 1978) . Similar considerations can be done for the interpretation of sentences in natural language. Poggi and Pelachaud compared`surprise' with`doubt' and perplexity', to show that they share some features of the face expression (raising of eyebrows) and a common core of meaning, although they originate from different communication goals (Poggi & Pelachaud, 2000) .
The only reasonable solution to this ambiguity problem is to try to come to a plausible interpretation by combining all information available. This means, ¢rst of all, combining verbal with nonverbal signs by giving an appropriate`weight' to each of them, for instance with a belief network (as in Ball & Breese, 2000) . However, in several situations, integrating information about these signs with knowledge about their possible meaning may contribute to further disambiguate the interpretation. This implies reasoning on the event, the action or the object (to employ OCC model) which probably produced the perceived state and on the mechanism which`triggered' that state and the decision to manifestöor to partially hideöit: the goals and beliefs that possibly produced it and their relation with the presumed mental state of the interlocutor. To this aim, some insight on the cognitive background of affective states is needed. Identical considerations may be forwarded for the generation of affective expressions or behaviors, that may take advantage of a representation of the situations in which they occur.
So, in the end, representing the cognitive aspects of affective states may ease and qualify their interpretation or generation. If the Speaker can reason on the Interlocutor's mind and try to infer what brought her to produce the (verbal and/or non-verbal) communicative act he received, he will have more chance of responding appropriately to the`real' problem, rather than manifesting a generic`empathy' towards that person. He will also reason on whether to manifest or not his emotion, according to its`intensity', his personality, the context in which interaction takes place and so on.
We, in the User Modeling and Adaptation area, may ¢nd excellent hints for our work in this domain in the theories proposed by cognitive psychologists that I already cited in this Preface: the theory of personality and its relationship with goals by Carbonell (1980) ; the theory of`subjective importance' of emotions by Ortony (1988) ; the emotion model architecture proposed by Frijda and Swagerman (1987) ; the theory of cognitive evaluation of social emotions by Castelfranchi (2000) , and many more. Several useful references may be found in the papers published in this Issue and also in (Hudlicka & Fellows, 1996) .
What we might do is to reconsider these theories and experiences in the light of the methods that have been applied successfully in User and context-adapted systems, during the last ten years. We will have to consider a number of questions, such as the following:
. Given that the main difference between representation of personality, mood (or attitude) and emotion seems to be related to their`stability', may we conclude that this difference has something to do with long and short-term user modeling? if so, how may short and long-term features be integrated? . How might distinct (either complementary or contradictory) affective aspects be assembled into a cognitively plausible combination within an Agent model? . What are the advantages of the various methods that might be employed in building cognitive models of affective states and their relationship with non-affective components? For instance: are production rules, belief networksöstatic or dynamicöinference networks, neural networks etc suitable formalisms, and in which situations?
I do not pretend to provide an answer to these questions. I will just try to summarise some of the hypotheses forwarded by the above-mentioned theories, which should not be forgotten when making our methodological proposals, if we want to avoid the risk of oversimplifying the problem:
1. A¡ective factors are linked to goals (Carbonell, 1980; Castelfranchi, 2000) ;
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. personalities may be de¢ned in terms of weights given to goal hierarchies, of deviations from con¢gurations of goals considered as`typical of a normal situation'; . emotions are triggered from the belief about the success/failure to achieve a goal due to some`interrupt' (change) in the external event or to some internal cognitive processing; . emotions control the process of goal achievement by informing the individual whether the monitored goals are compromised or have been achieved; . emotions activate irrational goals without the mediation of planning: positive appraisal activates`approach' goals while negative appraisal activates avoidance' goals.
Notice that various characteristics of goals are important in the simulation of a¡ective factors: having/not having a goal, with a given weight; goal activation/ inactivation; goal achievement; goal monitoring.
2. Time plays a crucial role in di¡erentiating and characterising a¡ective factors (Pfeifer, 1988; Ortony, 1988; Lisetti, next issue; Castelfranchi, 2000) ;
. the difference between personality traits, attitudes, moods and emotions may be described in terms of`time stability'. . the emotional state of an agent at a given time depends on his/her mental state at that time, on the events which occurred in the time immediately preceding it, but also on his/her previous emotional state; emotions evolve according to a decay/enhancement mechanism:`once generated, (they) do not stay around forever'.
3. Context in£uences emotion triggering Ortony, 1988; Elliott, 1994; Poggi & Pelachaud, 2000) :
. the external environment in£uences emotion elicitation through beliefs about events, objects, actions that may affect achievement or threatening of goals; these facts are evaluated in terms of their`desirability', the degree to which they are realised at a given time, the degree of effort expended in attempting to prevent or to foster them etc; . the social environment in£uences emotion regulation. Personality and emotions have a social valence: that is, they are culturally praised and encouraged or criticised and discouraged. In addition, they are displayed in order to achieve some goal. As a consequence, their display is in£uenced by the personality and/or the affective state of the interlocutor(s), their role and the power relationships with them etc;
4. Emotions may be activated endogenously, not necessarily by external events: therefore, the monitoring mechanism that is responsible for deciding whether and how an emotion might be triggered should analyze the internal mental state of the agent, in addition to the external environment;
5. A¡ective factors interact among themselves: emotion triggering is in£uenced by the belief that achievement of a`primary' goal (that is important for the Agent) is in£uenced (either directly or indirectly, through some`instrumental' goal) by a given event; the weight given to primary goals is related, in its turn, to the personality. The two factors combine to de¢ne a general relationship between personality traits (or attitudes) and emotional states. In particular, one of the traits in the FFM (neuroticism, or`emotional stability') contributes to de¢ning a threshold in the activation of emotions, the propensity for a given emotional reaction; 6. The combination of di¡erent (potential) a¡ective states is a complex mechanism (Carbonell, 1980) : complementarity or contradiction between states may exist, and`resolution criteria' that decide how to combine them have to be established; 7. Emotions have an intensity (Ortony, 1988; Elliott & Siegle, 1993) : the agent's behavior depends not only on his/her being in some emotional state, but also in the intensity of this state: a`threshold' e¡ect regulates the decision to display it. An agent may be more or less ambitious, may feel more or less fear, etc. The face, gesture, voice manifestation of these states depends on its intensity, as well as on the plans or goals that are activated as a consequence of this state.
Variables that are thought to a¡ect the emotion intensity may be categorised according to their stability; 8. Uncertainty cannot be ignored: as the phenomenon is very complex (Pfeifer, 1985) , pretending to model it in a purely logical way is probably not realistic. Uncertainty should be introduced in the`triggering', the`display' and the`recognition' mechanisms.
Which formalisms may respond to these needs? Maybe different ones, according to the particular application domain and therefore to the particular aspect considered. Maybe hybrid models, as Pfeifer suggested might be useful. Here, the old and wellknown exhortation, by Elaine Rich, to`be realistic', is, once again, precious (Rich, 1988) . In representing the so-called`rational' aspects of the User, we have never tried to build complete models of their mind (what Borges would call`a world map of natural size'): therefore, we probably don't need to model all possible affective states of the User. We should try to assess, ¢rst of all, whether affective factors are really relevant in the application domain considered. Then, ideally, we should accurately select those factors which have to be considered in that domain; for instance, fear or anxiety in doctor^patient interaction and, in general, in riskful situations. We should look for parameters that enable recognising that state as much unobtrusively as possible. Whenever possible, we should collect a corpus of data on how humans behave in similar circumstances and should analyse them to better understand the phenomenon. At this point, we would be ready to build our models and would, ¢nally, evaluate the results obtained by comparing them with the corpus. This last point would require developing ad hoc methods, especially if the goal is to evaluate not only the`convincingness' of an affective interface but also whether affective factors do in£uence the Users behavior`as if' they were interacting with a human, affective interlocutor.
